Abstract
At 15 August 2005, the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which aimed at ending the separatist conflict which during 29 years have seen more than 15 000 people in the province killed. The signing of a peace agreement is not unique in Aceh; the uniqueness lies in the fact that 20 months later, Aceh is still at peace. A former GAM leader is now democratically elected as governor in the province, embodying the enduring transformation of the conflict from bullets to ballots. This thesis asks how the MoU could be possible.
The study of the Aceh conflict lies at the crossroad of theory and practice, and existing theory prove inadequate in capturing the particularities of the case. Conflict resolution theory is limited in its organic view of conflict and its narrow focus on stages of conflict or settlements, and missing out on the larger picture. Conversely, the circular view of conflict transformation is better suited for the study of Aceh. Visualizing conflict as a spiral opens for a contextual search for the conditions which may serve to turn a destructive conflict spiral. However, this approach disregards the influence which the very dynamics of the negotiation process may pose on protracted issues and positions.
This thesis seeks to bridge these levels by merging relevant tools from the two approaches. It first seeks to find the internal, external and relational contextual changes which facilitated a ripe moment for returning to talks in late 2004. It then discusses how the 2005 Helsinki process served to loosen up protracted positions regarding the final political status of Aceh. In particular it is argued that both GoI and GAM were forced to adapt to the new democratic environment and values after the fall of authoritarian rule in 1998. At the GoI side, the 2004 election saw a presidential change elevating to power actors who benefited from peace rather than war. At the GAM side, the adoption of democratic and non-violent rhetoric saw GAM rise to a popular movement, only to be severely repressed as the Indonesian military introduced Martial Law in 2003. This thesis argues that by late 2004, GAM might be facing a hurting stalemate, but that there existed no visible Way Out to induce them to resume negotiations before the Indian Ocean Tsunami struck Aceh, killing an incomprehensible number of 160 000 people.
The following negotiations in Helsinki followed a comprehensive formula in which the core contradictions of the conflict had to be agreed on before even small matters could be agreed on. This added pressure on the parties, but the situation drew towards a stalemate on the core issue of the political status of Aceh. The great turning point came as GAM put their independence claim aside and rather demanded a self-governing solution; ending the 29 years impasse by opening a bargaining space for details which not previously had existed. This remarkable change of goals is seen to reflect a gradual transformative process within GAM, though the final step must be ascribed to the dynamics of the negotiation process. Still, the situation drew towards a second stalemate on one final issue as GoI was reluctant to allow for local political parties in Aceh, and hence provide GAM with an opportunity to represent itself politically. In the final hour GoI gave way, allowing for the MoU to be signed.