Abstract
The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 took much of the world by surprise. Russia’s actions prompted harsh critique and reactions by many Western countries and introduced a new chill in Russia Western relations not seen since the end of the Cold War. The Ukraine crisis also negatively affected Russia’s relations with its Nordic neighbors and resulted in a negative spillover to the Nordic region in form of increased tensions and uncertainty. However, research on Russian security policy towards the Nordic region, as well as research on broader Russia Nordic security relations, particularly from a Russian viewpoint, is scarce in general, and in the period following the crisis in Ukraine in particular. By pursuing the aim to contextualize, analyze, and explain Russian security policy in the Nordic region in the context of the 2014 Ukraine crisis, this thesis allows for a comprehensive study of Russia’s security policy in the Nordic region and contributes both empirically and theoretically to the field of Russian security studies by providing new research and enhancing knowledge on Russian security policy in the Nordic region specifically, and the larger field of Russian security studies. The thesis makes use of the classical strategy concepts, defined as ends, ways, means, in order to map and analyze both Russia’s security policy ends (goals) in the region and the various ways and tools Russia has at its disposal in order to enhance and meet these interests and ends. This thesis argues that Russia’s security policy towards the Nordic region is characterized by both continuity and change. Russia’s overall security policy ends in the region have remained remarkably stable, when compared to earlier periods. This may indicate that Russia, despite the increased tensions, is interested in the region remaining peaceful. Continuity may also be explained by the fact that despite the increased tensions, Russia’s threat perceptions have remained the same (even though some of the traditional Russian concerns have exacerbated in the studied period due to increased Western military presence). However, the study also finds that Russia’s ways, and to a lesser extent its means, have changed in the 2014-2016 time period. This may indicate that Russia to a larger degree is willing to act and use its tools more aggressively, both military and rhetorically, in order to enhance and protect its interests in the Nordic region. Lastly, the study argues that Russia prefers to approach the Nordic region in a diversified or partly diversified manner, rather than a unified way. This may indicate that the latter gives Russia less leeway to meet and pursue its interests in the Nordic region.